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THE ABA'S ROLE IN PRESCREENING
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CANDIDATES:
ARE WE READY TO GIVE UP ON THE LAWYERS?
Laura E. Little*
In March 2001, George W. Bush's administration eliminated the American Bar
Association (ABA) from prescreeningjudicial candidates before their nominations
are made public and forwarded to the Senate. Notifying the ABA of this decision,
the administration resolved to treat the ABA like other "interest groups and
individual citizens," withholding from the bar association the "advance notice of the
identities of potential nominees" necessary for the ABA to render "pre-nomination
opinions on their fitness for judicial service."' Given that the ABA "takes public
positions on divisive political, legal, and social issues that come before the courts,"
the administration concluded that allowing the ABA a "preferential, quasi-official
role" in judicial evaluation was "particularly inappropriate."2 Finally, the
administration embraced the position that "permitting a political interest group
[such as the ABA] to be elevated to an officially sanctioned role in the confirmation
process not only debases that process, but... ultimately detracts from the moral
authority of the courts themselves."3
Subsequent news reports find irony in the strong ideological credentials of those
insiders the president has designated to vet judicial candidates,4 the suggestion
* Professor of Law, Temple University's Beasley School of Law. I am especially grateful
for the excellent research assistance of Sarah Westbrook. I also thank my colleagues Theresa
Glennon, Amy Boss, and Eleanor Myers for their guidance.
Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, to Martha W. Barnett,
President, American Bar Association (Mar. 22, 2001), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/03/20010322-5.html (reproduced in
Appendix to this article) [hereinafter Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales].
2 Id.
Id. (quoting Sen. Orrin Hatch).
" See, e.g., ABA Thrown out of Judge-Screening Process, MONT. LAWYER, Apr. 2001,
at 27; Editorial, Here Come the Judges, THE NATION, Apr. 16, 2001, at 3 (stating that
"Gonzales let the word go forth that in selecting nominees he and John Ashcrofi will heed
the Federalist Society and kindred far-right legal groups whose acolytes honeycomb this
Administration"); Neil A. Lewis, Bush to Reveal First Judicial Choices Soon, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 24, 2001, at A17 (reporting officials as stating that of the 70 judicial candidates
interviewed by the Bush Whitehouse, "17 to 20 had been recommended directly by the
Federalist Society's Washington headquarters"); Neil A. Lewis, A Conservative Legal Group
Thrives in Bush's Washington, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2001, at Al (reporting on influence of
Federalist Society in Bush White House and that Bush's decision to end the ABA's
prescreening role "delighted many Federalist Society members who had yearned for such a
move").
Gonzales made clear that.., the association [was] especially unsuited to evaluate
judges because... it was a 'politically active group,' but noting that '[m]any of the
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being that the ABA is not too political for the job, but just on the wrong side of the
political spectrum.' The difference, of course, is that the president's insiders are
his fancy: the Constitution allows the president complete discretion to confer with
whomever she chooses in nominating candidates for the bench, and the Constitution
does not require the president to allow the ABA to evaluate candidates before
announcing their names and forwarding them to the Senate.
The question, then, is simply whether ABA participation early in the process
is best for the nation. Although I ultimately settle on a qualified yes to this
question, I note a number of reasonable objections weighing against such a
privileged and powerful role in selecting judges. While no doubt underlying some
of the Bush Administration's statements, these objections are not mirrored in the
rationales put forth in the March letter to the ABA. Indeed, contrary to the
administration's suggestion, potent reasoning suggests that the ABA's role in
judicial evaluation should be different from other "political interest group[s]."6 In
its ability to scrutinize and to evaluate potential judicial nominees, the ABA
possesses expertise not likely shared by organizations like the Sierra Club and the
National Right to Life Committee! The ABA's participation early in the
appointment process appropriately reinforces the constitutional system for
lawyers who are now in charge of the process of choosing judges in the White
House are associated with groups like the Federalist Society, a conservative
organization that has taken the lead in trying to eject the bar association from its
role in evaluating judges.
ABA Thrown out of Judge-Screening Process, supra note 4.
' See, e.g., Byron York, Disbarred!.: Bush Throws the ABA Out, NAT'L REV., Apr. 16,
2001 (reporting that the 15 member ABA Committee was composed of 7 members who
previously contributed solely to Democrats and 2 members who previously contributed solely
to Republicans at the time of the Bush Administration decision); Editorial, Ousting ABA is
Injudicious Move, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Mar. 26,200 1, at A6 (asserting that "[i]t's difficult
to see how the ABA ouster serves a public as opposed to political purpose"). But cf George
Lardner, "Careful" Judicial Vetting Process; White House Shuns Politics, Counsel Says as
Nominations Near, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 2001, at A17 (reporting that White House
spokesman announced that the White House counsel's office is not applying "political litimus
tests" in making recommendations).
6 Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, supra note 1 (quoting Sen. Orrin Hatch).
See ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 7 (1953)
(opining that the ABA is not "the same sort of thing as a retail grocers' association"). Contra
The ABA Role in the Judicial Nomination Process: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 101st Cong. 14 (1989) (Hon. Orrin G. Hatch, Senator, Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, stating that it is not appropriate to give the ABA a "special status not accorded to
any other group on any other nomination"); Bruce Fein, Praiseworthy Choices for the Bench,
WASH. TIMES, May 15, 2001, at A18 (opining that "[t]he ABA's voice on judicial
appointments should be no greater nor less than the AFL-CIO's on Labor Department
nominations or the Chamber of Commerce's on Commerce Department selections").
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nomination and confirmation and adds a stable voice to the power struggles that our
Constitution envisions will occur as presidential administrations come and go.
Perhaps most notable about the Bush Administration's letter is its suggestion
that integrating a national bar association's opinions on judicial selection "detracts
from the moral authority of courts."' Not only is this statement symptomatic of the
declining dignity and prestige of lawyers generally,9 but it also illustrates the costs
of the ABA's decision to take positions on controversial social issues. While the
ABA's decision to speak out prompts concern, the suggestion that the decision
should disqualify the organization from its judicial vetting role appears based on
oversimplistic thinking. The resolve to express public positions is not only
supported by our society's ideal of lawyers as opinion leaders, but is also consistent
with nuanced understanding of impartiality in the courts.
The statement's implicit contempt for lawyers and the American Bar
Association should not, however, go unheeded. The ABA's explicitly controversial
positions have surely contributed to its public relations problems and have
magnified suspicions that the ABA uses judicial evaluations to implement policy
objectives under the whitewash of "judicial fitness." Whether or not the ABA is
guilty of this subterfuge, the broadly held suspicion of the organization's lack of
candor is not helpful to the ABA, the federal government, or the public. The
solution, however, is not to ax the lawyers from the early judicial evaluation, but to
improve their contributions through refined procedures.
I. HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION'S ROLE IN FEDERAL JUDICIAL
SELECTION
In 1952, the attorney general for President Eisenhower concluded that the
administration needed an independent review body to examine the qualifications of
potential judicial nominees so that the administration could more ably resist
pressure to repay political debts by appointing individuals of questionable talents
and abilities to the federal bench.' ° The Eisenhower Administration thereafter
8 Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, supra note 1 (quoting Sen. Orrin Hatch).
9 The decision is part of a trend within the G.W. Bush administration generally not to
rely on lawyers as much as previous administrations. David S. Broder, Editorial, Good Start
by the Bush Team, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2001, at B7 (calling Bush's cabinet a "cabinet of
CEOs"); Andrew Sullivan, Editorial, Bush: Style is Character, THE STAR-LEDGER(Newark,
N.J.), Jan. 7,200 1, available at 2001 WL 9801544 (comparing Bush's staff to Clinton's, the
author notes: "We have gone from a Cabinet of yea-saying lawyers to a Cabinet of grown-up
CEOs."); Lee Walczak & Richard S. Dunham, Commentary, Who's In Charge Here,
Anyway?, Bus. WEEK, Apr. 9, 2001, at 78 (referring to Bush's staff, author says Bush
"designed his team on a corporate model").
10 The Miller Center of Public Affairs, Improving the Process of Appointing Federal
Judges: Report of the Miller Center Commission on the Selection of Federal Judges 10
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sought the views of the American Bar Association on potential federal judicial
nominees. The ABA's role quickly became institutionalized as an adjunct to the
executive's constitutional role of nominating federal judges.
According to public accounts, United States presidents in the modem era have
used a judicial selection committee staffed by senior White House and Department
of Justice officials to develop a list of federal judicial nominees. As part of this
committee, the Justice Department has confidentially provided the names of
potential judicial nominees to the ABA Standing Committee on the Federal
Judiciary to obtain that Committee's evaluation of judicial candidates."
The ABA Committee has fifteen members - two from the Ninth Circuit, one
from the other twelve judicial circuits, and one member-at-large. The president
of the ABA appoints the members for staggered three-year terms, and no member
serves more than two terms. 3 The ABA Committee's "sole function" is to evaluate
prospective nominees to the Supreme Court of the United States, United States
Circuit Courts of Appeals, United States District Courts, and the Court of
International Trade.'4 The Committee only evaluates candidates referred by the
attorney general or the White House and formally omits from its evaluation "a
prospective nominee's philosophy or ideology."' 5 Instead, the Committee seeks to
confine its inquiry "to issues bearing on a prospective nominee's professional
qualifications."' 6
(1996), available at http://millercenter.virginia.edu/pdf/commissions/commission7.pdf
(explaining that Attorney General Brownell involved the ABA to assure that a senator's
political preference was also a competent lawyer); Roberta Cooper Ramo & N. Lee Cooper,
The American Bar Association's Integral Role in the Federal Judicial Selection Process:
Excerpted Testimony of Roberta Cooper Ramo and N. Lee Cooper Before the Judiciary
Committee of the United States Senate, May 21, 1996, 12 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT.
93 (1996) (outlining history of ABA Committee).
" Brief for the Federal Appellee, 1988 U.S. Briefs 429, at 3, Pub. Citizen v. United
States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 443-45 (1989) (Nos. 88-429 and 88-494) (outlining
ABA Committee's role).
12 American Bar Association, TheABA Standing Committee on FederalJudiciary: What
it is and How it Works at 1 (1999), available at http://www.abanet.org/poladv/scfedjud.pdf.
[hereinafter ABA Standing Committee].
13 Id.
14 Id.
1S Id.
16 Id. The ABA describes its ratings as follows:
To merit Well Qualified, the prospective nominee must be at the top of the legal
profession in his or her legal community, have outstanding legal ability, wide
experience, the highest reputation for integrity and either have shown or have
exhibited the capacity for, judicial temperament, and have the Committee's
strongest affirmative endorsement. The evaluation of Qualified means that the
prospective nominee meets the Committee's very high standards with respect to
[Vol. 10: 1
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The procedures for ABA evaluation differed for prospective Supreme Court
nominees and nominees to lower courts. Before the Bush Administration
eliminated early ABA input, potential lower court nominees commenced the
evaluation process by completing an ABA-designed questionnaire and submitting
it to White House officials and the ABA Committee. 7 Using the questionnaire
answers, an ABA Committee member examined the candidate's legal writings and
interviewed a cross-section of lawyers, judges, and legal educators in the
candidate's community, as well as members of professional organizations and other
groups interested in the nomination process." The candidate also met with the
ABA Committee. A committee member then prepared a written report that
summarized the interviews, evaluated the candidate's qualifications, and tentatively
rated the candidate using three categories: "well qualified," "qualified," and "not
qualified."' 9  This informal evaluation served as a "prediction as [to] what the
ABA's formal inquiry [would] find."2
The ABA Committee then communicated this informal rating of lower court
nominees to the Justice Department on a confidential basis.2 If the Justice
integrity, professional competence and judicial temperament and that the Committee
believes that the prospective nominee will be able to perform satisfactorily all of the
responsibilities required by the high office of a federal judge.
When a prospective nominee is found Not Qualified, the Committee's investigation
has indicated that the prospective nominee does not meet the Committee's standards
with regard to professional competence, judicial temperament, or integrity.
Id. at9.
,7 Id. at 5.
t HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF
APPOINTM ENTSTO THE SUPREMECOURT 38 (3d ed. 1992) (outlining interview process); JOEL
B. GROSSMAN, LAwYERS AND JUDGES: THE ABA AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL SELECTION
94-95 (1965) (explaining that ABA Committee members can exert considerable influence
by strategically choosing individuals to interview); Brief for the Federal Appellee, 1988 U.S.
Briefs 429, at 3, Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. 440, 443-45 (1989) (Nos. 88-429 and 88-494)
(outlining ABA Committee's role); American Bar Association, supra note 12, at 13
(outlining interview process).
'9 A fourth category - "exceptionally well qualified"-was discontinued during the first
Bush Administration. ABRAHAM, supra note 18, at 33 (stating that the category was dropped
in 1989); ROBERTA. CARP & RONALD STIDHAM, JUDICIALPROCESS IN AMERICA 227 (4th ed.
1998) (stating that the qualification was dropped in 1991); SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING
FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN 10
(1997) (stating that the category was dropped at the beginning of George Bush's
Administration). Different ratings are used for Supreme Court Justices. ABRAHAM, supra
note 18, at 34.
20 GOLDMAN, supra note 19, at 10 (first alteration in original), (quoting Warren
Christopher, Memorandum to My Successor, Nov. 26, 1968).
21 See ABRAHAM, supra note 18, at 38 (noting that the ABA Committee commences its
2oo01]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
Department so requested, the ABA Committee then prepared a formal report, which
included a rating polled from the entire Committee.22 The chair of the ABA
Committee thereafter communicated this rating to the Justice Department,
occasionally sharing the reasons behind the rating.23 The ABA Committee
generally did not, however, reveal committee sources or the internal, informal
reports of individual Committee members.24 Finally, the attorney general evaluated
the rating in light of other information and communicated the rating to the president
along with a recommendation whether to nominate the candidate.
The presidents, of course, retained their discretion over whether to nominate,
varying in their decisions whether or not to nominate persons rated "unqualified."2
When the president approved the candidate, the nomination and the complete
dossier were sent to the Senate Judiciary Committee, which already should have
received its own appraisal report from the ABA Committee directly.26 In the rare
event that a president proceeded with the nomination of an individual rated "[n]ot
[q]ualified," the ABA Committee opposed "the nomination in such ways as may be
appropriate under the circumstances."27
For prospective Supreme Courtnominees, all Committee members participated
in the investigation and teams of law school professors and practicing lawyers
examined the legal writings of the nominee.28 While the same factors were
considered for lower court nominations, "the Committee's investigation [was] based
on the premise that the Supreme Court requires a person with exceptional
professional qualifications." '29 The Committee provided its ratings of prospective
nominees confidentially to the attorney general "and, after nomination, reported [the
investigatory work in camera); GROSSMAN, supra note 18, at 94 (noting that the impact of
this informal report depends on timing, with less impact resulting if political commitments
are already made at the time the attorney general receives the report); Brief for the Federal
Appellee, 1988 U.S. Briefs 429, at 3, Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. 440 (Nos. 88-429 and 88-494)
(emphasizing confidential nature of the ABA Committee's work).
22 GOLDMAN, supra note 19, at 11 (explaining that the attorney general requests the
formal ABA report concurrently with an FBI check of the judicial candidate); ABRAHAM,
supra note 18, at 34 (noting that each member of the ABA Committee acts independently and
by mail).
23 ABA Standing Committee, supra note 12, at 6.
24 Brief for the Federal Appellee, 1988 U.S. Briefs 429, at 3, Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. 440
(Nos. 88-429 and 88-494).
25 GROSSMAN, supra note 18, at 78-79, 144-53; Brief for the Federal Appellee, 1988 U.S.
Briefs 429, at 3, Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. 440 (Nos. 88-429 and 88-494) (outlining ABA
Committee's role).
26 ABRAHAM, supra note 18, at 38.
27 ABA Standing Committee, supra note 12, at 9.
28 Id. at 11.
29 Id. at 10.
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ratings] to the Senate Judiciary Committee."" ° A Committee representative may
explain the reasons for the rating at the Senate's confirmation hearing, while
seeking to preserve source confidentiality.3
Although presidents have not consistently followed the same procedures for
Supreme Court nominations, they roughly followed the procedures outlined above
for lower court nominations from 1952 through the Clinton years.32 Nevertheless,
presidents have varied in their esteem for the ABA and the weight they accorded to
ABA ratings.33 A high water mark appeared in 1969 when Deputy Attorney
General Richard Kleindienst told the ABA Convention that the Nixon
Administration had accorded the ABA's Federal Judiciary Committee absolute veto
power over all federal judicial candidates it considered unqualified.34 Nixon,
however, later changed his mind, and a long period of reduced deference has
followed.35
Before George W. Bush's decision to oust the ABA from early participation,
another particularly low point of ABA esteem occurred during the Reagan
Administration. Reagan, like Carter, kept the ABA Standing Committee on the
Federal Judiciary at arm's length. Yet unlike earlier administrations, the Reagan
Administration did not always wait for the ABA's formal report before the attorney
general sent over official nominating documents - and sometimes acted before
receiving an informal report from the ABA.36 Although liberals apparently were
30 Id. at 12.
31 id.
32 ABRAHAM, supra note 18, at 32 (reporting up until 1992); GROSSMAN, supra note 18,
at 69-81 (reporting up until 1965); Brief for the Federal Appellee, 1988 U.S. Briefs 429, at
3, Pub. Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440,443-45 (1989) (Nos. 88-429
and 88-494) (reporting up until 1989); see MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 229 (2000) (stating that "the ABA has been formally involved with
evaluating prospective judicial nominees since 1952 and with evaluating both prospective
and actual judicial nominees since Jimmy Carter's presidency").
" William G. Ross, Participation by the Public in the Federal Judicial Selection
Process, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1, 37 (1990) (reporting that "Presidents have accorded different
levels of deference to the ABA's opinions").
34 ABRAHAM, supra note 18, at 32 (reporting on Kleindienst's comment); see CARP &
STIDHAM, supra note 19, at 228 (reporting that Nixon initially declared "that he would
appoint no one who did not have the blessing of the ABA").
11 LAURENCEBAUM, AMERICAN COURTS 109 (4th ed. 1998) (stating that Reagan, Bush,
and Clinton refused to allow ABA full range of power it enjoyed with previous
administrations); CARP & STIDHAM, supra note 19, at 228 (reporting that in response to a
suggestion that a potential candidate would not fare well under ABA scrutiny, Nixon replied
"Fuck the ABA"); Laura E. Little, Loyalty, Gratitude, and the Federal Judiciary, 44 AM. U.
L. REV. 699, 737 (1995) (reporting that the Standing Committee's influence apparently
peaked during the Nixon Administration).
36 GOLDMAN, supra note 19, at 323-24 (providing history of Reagan Administration's
judicial selection).
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unhappy with the ABA during this time, Republican displeasure was resounding
and unanimous - particularly in reaction to the ABA Committee's failure to
recommend unanimously Robert Bork as "well qualified" for the Supreme Court
(four Committee members apparently found Bork unqualified for lack of a judicial
temperament). 7
Retribution initially came in the form of scrutiny: first, the Senate convened a
hearing devoted to the ABA Committee and its role in the confirmation process;
next, suit was filed against the Justice Department and the ABA for violating the
federal open meeting law by keeping judicial evaluation records confidential.38 The
Supreme Court decided this suit in favor of the ABA.39 The most recent retribution
for the Bork nomination, some say, came to reduce the ABA vetting role."
Whatever the precise causal relationship for the "bad blood," one cannot deny that
the ABA's most aggressive enemies have, in recent years, been powerful
Republicans."
3" BAUM, supra note 35, at 109 (describing Republican displeasure with the ABA
Committee because of perceived liberal bias in evaluation); GOLDMAN, supra note 19, at
326-27 (observing that both conservatives and liberals were displeased with the ABA during
this time period).
38 See GOLDMAN, supra note 19, at 323-24 (suggesting that the Senate hearing and
lawsuit were the product of liberal and conservative efforts); see also Henry J. Abraham,
Beneficial Advice or Presumptuous Veto?: The ABA's Committee on Federal Judiciary
Revisited, in JUDICIAL SELECTION: MERIT, IDEOLOGY, AND POLITICs 70 (Nat'l Legal Ctr. for
the Pub. Interest ed., 1990) (stating that the lawsuit was filed by a conservation organization,
which alleged that the ABA Committee "relied primarily on liberal interest groups to gather
information about judicial candidates and actually released names of... nominees to the
ultra-liberal Alliance for Justice, a group organized especially to thwart Reagan's promise
to shift the direction of the courts").
" See Pub. Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440,467 (1989) (holding
that the Federal Advisory Committee Act does not apply to the Justice Department's
solicitation of the ABA Committee views on prospective judicial nominees). For analysis of
the legal issues in this suit, see, for example, R. Townsend Davis, Jr., Note, The American
BarAssociation and Judicial Nominees: Advice Without Consent?, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 550
(1989).
40 See, e.g., Terry Carter, Squeeze Play, A.B.A.J., May 2001, at 18, 78 (reporting that
many observers attribute ouster to increasing attacks on the ABA by conservative political
groups and quoting Professor Sheldon Goldman as stating that Bush's move "essentially gave
some fresh meat to his more far-right supporters").
41 See, e.g., BAUM, supra note 35, at 109 (describing Republican displeasure with the
ABA Committee). See generally The Role of the American Bar Association in the Judicial
Selection Process: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996)
(Republican Senators critical of ABA track record with judicial nominations); The ABA Role
in the Judicial Nomination Process: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
supra note 7 (Republican Senators critical of ABA track record with judicial nominations).
The Bush decision to eliminate the ABA from early participation in the process mirrors
an earlier move by Sen. Orrin Hatch to eliminate any special status in the confirmation
[Vol. 10: 1
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1I. THE ABA AS AN INTEREST GROUP AND THE APPOINTMENT PROCESS
The George W. Bush Administration and other critics of the ABA suggest that
the organization enjoys the status of just another interest group possessing a
political or ideological orientation on who should staff the federal judiciary. This
view of the bar association ignores the association's unique expertise and suggests
that the ABA has squandered any claim to impartiality and clout it had through its
forays into controversial social debates. I argue that ABA vetting of possible
nominees continues to provide valuable insights, consistent with our constitutional
appointment process, even when viewed in light of any mistakes the association
may have made.
A. Lawyers' Expertise
Bar groups traditionally have dominated the process of evaluating candidates
for state and local judgeships. 2 This tradition may be interpreted as evidence of a
national consensus that lawyers are suited to the job of evaluating judicial fitness.
Yet the debate over whether lawyers should participate intimately in the
appointment of federal judges is not new to our country. In fact, Benjamin Franklin
quipped during the constitutional debates that the delegates should consider the
method for judicial appointments used in Scotland, "in which the nomination
proceeded from the Lawyers." ' Lawyers enjoyed a particular benefit, Franklin
wryly suggested, because they were in a position to chose strategically those
appointees with law practices the remaining lawyers could lucratively divide among
themselves."
Apparent jest aside, Franklin's implication that lawyers may be in a unique
position to know the details of nominees' careers and law practices merits attention.
In evaluating judicial candidates, lawyers not only have relationships with the right
people to answer questions about candidates," but - knowing the temptations and
process. See BAUM, supra note 35, at 109 (describing Hatch's decision); GERHARDT, supra
note 32, at 230 (describing Hatch's decision as a low point in ABA influence, attributable
"in no small measure" to the "divided vote on Robert Bork's qualifications as a Supreme
Court nominee").
42 See GROSSMAN, supra note 18, at 210 (citing the influence of bar groups for state and
local judicial selection).
41 I THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 120 (Max Farrand ed.,
1966).
" id.
41 See The ABA Role in the Judicial Nomination Process: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 7, 281-82 (statement of Sen. Herb Kohl, Member,
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, that the ABA's advice is helpful because it is in a "good
2001]
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soft spots in legal doctrine and procedure - lawyers are also able to ask the right
questions.46 This access is aided by the structure of the ABA, with its local and
national organization giving ABA interviewers the resources to access individuals
with personal knowledge of potential nominees.
Given the range of executive appointments necessary for our federal
government to function, our constitutional structure clearly envisions that the
president and Senate will look to others to assist in appointments. Indeed, the range
of appointments authorized by the Constitution's Appointments Clause is simply
too broad to suggest that the politicians are able to make informed judgments
themselves about necessary qualifications.47 Thus, when the appointment involves
officials who will staff the adjudicative process of developing and applying legal
principles, those who possess special knowledge of that process - lawyers - are
the most natural agents to assist with appointment decisions.48 Knowledge of law,
legal method, and governmental institutions combine with rhetorical skills to make
lawyers particularly well-suited to evaluate who, in the sea of hopeful legal
practitioners, should sit as a judge."
Militating against this reasoning is the identity of those whom the lawyers are
advising: professional politicians who themselves may be lawyers. Even non-
lawyers in the executive branch and Senate are nevertheless in the business of
developing laws, an expertise obviously relevant to evaluating the fitness ofjudicial
candidates who will apply those laws. Moreover, as one critic observes, the ABA
position to solicit relevant information from the nominee's peers").
46 See The Role of the American Bar Association in the Judicial Selection Process:
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 99 (1996) (statement of
Prof. Daniel J. Meador):
One of the things we would lose without a body like the ABA committee would be
the investigative resources and information that it does bring to light without any
expense to the taxpayers. I think it does get information that the FBI does not get,
could not get, that no other governmental entity might get.
Id.
47 See GERHARDT, supra note 32, at 40-41 (observing that "presidents and senators must
rely on others to advise them" about fitness of nominees because "it is unlikely that
presidents and senators will be experts themselves in the fields in which these nominees will
perform their specialized tasks").
48 See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 359 (1993) (describing as reasonable the suggestion that lawyers possess
distinctive expertise in the interpretation and understanding of legal rules).
'9 See A. JAMES CASNER & W. BARON LEACH, CASE AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 2 (3d ed.
1984) ("It is an observable fact that through some combination of chromosomes and
professional training lawyers tend to come to the top of the barrel in the shaking and jolting
of competition for authority."), quoted in David J. Hardesty, Jr., Leading Lawyers: An Essay
on Why Lawyers Lead in America, 10-APR W. VA. LAW. 26, 26 (1997).
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is not the only source of lawyers in the country." Indeed, the president and senators
have plenty of lawyers on their staffs to assist them in evaluating judicial
candidates. On the other hand, those staff members are likely to have networks
duplicative of their bosses and have a primary duty to the senator's or president's
public policy agendas."1 As explored more fully below, the ABA can tap its
members' legal expertise in an independent setting, bringing a fresh perspective to
the question of judicial fitness and using criteria and procedures that can remain
consistent across changing presidential administrations.
B. Has the ABA Disqualified Itself by Becoming Too Politicized?
Some say the ABA's historical clout comes in part from its ability to make an
impartial judgment about the fitness of judicial candidates free from political or
ideological bias. 2 The Bush Administration and others suggest that the ABA lost
credibility in its neutrality claim by taking positions on controversial issues.53 Later
in this section, I examine the public relations ramifications of ABA positions on
controversial issues, ramifications that indeed may reflect negatively on the ABA's
role in judicial evaluation. The public relations question, however, is independent
of another point implicit in the administration's March 2001 letter to the ABA: the
argument that the ABA's position on public policy issues disqualifies it from
prescreening potential nominees. A balanced, well-developed understanding of our
constitutional judicial appointments process, impartiality principles, and the social
role of lawyers all support a contrary conclusion on the disqualification question.
1. Political Battles are an Inevitable Part of the Appointment Process
50 See Paul D. Kamenar, The Role of the American Bar Association in the Judicial
Selection Process, in JUDICIAL SELECTION: MERIT, IDEOLOGY, AND POLITICS 93, 100 (Nat'l
Legal Ctr. for the Pub. Interested., 1990) (arguing that there is nothing "unique" about ABA
lawyers and that "[e]qually capable if not more qualified lawyers at the Department of Justice
and on [the Senate Judiciary] Committee and its staff could also interview the same sources
as the ABA now does, and form their own opinion on the candidate's qualifications")
(alteration in original).
"' This criticism does not disqualify the possibility that an association other than the ABA
may provide an alternative. While reference to organizations such as the National Bar
Association appears in the literature, there is yet to occur serious evaluation of the merits of
this possibility. The other alternative - vetting by an association of judges - is also not
discussed in the literature, perhaps because the threat to judicial relationships and impartiality
would disincline the judges' association away from the vetting responsibility.
2 See, e.g., The ABA Role in the Judicial Nomination Process: Hearing Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 7, 285 (1989) (statement of Sen. Joseph R.
Biden, Jr., Chairman, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, that the "ABA has the clout that it has"
because the press and the public consider it to be one of the least political organizations).
" See Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, supra note 1.
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The argument that the ABA has disqualified itself through its controversial
public policy positions appears not to rest on any suggestion that the Constitution
somehow prohibits the executive branch from consulting the ABA before formal
judicial nominations. The Constitution leaves the president, the attorney general,
and anyone else in the executive branch free to seek advice from whatever sources
she desires and to weigh the advice in whatever way she chooses. 4 The Bush
Administration's argument instead seems to derive from concern that thejudiciary's
independence suffers where a "quasi-official" participant such as the ABA has
known public policy preference - particularly on issues that a potential nominee
may later encounter as a judge." Because of these expressed views, the March
letter reasons, an agent such as the ABA "debases" the confirmation process and
"detracts from the moral authority of courts."56
Our Constitution's appointment process is not sufficiently pristine to afford
much weight to this reasoning. Whether or not the Framers so intended, the process
is already so politicized, and judicial candidates so exposed to influence during
nomination and confirmation,57 that the ABA's public policy announcements in
contexts removed from judicial evaluation are unlikely to change the process's
character, much less erode the "moral authority of the courts."58
In making these observations, I do not ignore that scholars, politicians, and
social critics have almost universally disclaimed the political battles played out
during confirmation proceedings, particularly in recent years.59 The source of the
54 See GROSSMAN, supra note 18, at 212 (expressing the view that no constitutional
problems dog the relationship between the ABA Committee and the attorney general).
55 Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, supra note 1.
56 Id. (quoting Sen. Orrin Hatch).
51 See Little, supra note 35, at 730-40 (demonstrating how the confirmation process
creates bonds of loyalty and gratitude between judge candidates and those individuals who
make possible the confirmation, but concluding that the ABA's role is not such as to cast the
organization as "a powerful benefactor for federal judges," id. at 737); see also GROSSMAN,
supra note 18, at 219 (citing evidence of association between prior political affiliation and
decisionmaking tendencies).
58 Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, supra note 1 (quoting Sen. Orrin Hatch).
'9 See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION
OF THE LAW 348 (1990) (claiming that as the confirmation process becomes more politicized,
judicial nominees are treated like political candidates, as evidenced by the nomination of
Robert H. Bork); STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP THE
FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 88 (1994) (observing that senators have long struggled
to find grounds other than ideology on which to base opposition to a nominee which is really
ideological); PATRICK B. MCGUIGAN & DAWN M. WEYRICH, NINTH JUSTICE: THE FIGHT FOR
BORK 209 (1990) (noting that a "judicial war" ensued after the nomination of Judge Bork in
which both parties engaged in "guerilla warfare" tactics); Cynthia S. Roper et al., Sex, Race,
and Politics: An Intercultural Communication Approach to the Hill-Thomas Hearings, in
THE LYNCHING OF LANGUAGE 55, (Sandra L. Ragan et al. eds., 1996) (stating that
partisanship turned the Hill-Thomas hearings into a "political and ideological battle" rather
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rancor, however, so prominently derives from government officials and political
parties themselves as to undermine a claim that the ABA itself has poisoned the
confirmation process. Some have documented how the ABA has contributed to the
political circus atmosphere (the Bork nomination being the most frequent example
cited).6" Experience suggests, however, that high-pitched political battles will
continue without the ABA's contribution.6 What the Bush Administration has
done, therefore, is to omit valuable ABA expertise and resources from the vetting
process without showing that political squabbles will measurably diminish as a
consequence. I emphasize that the administration is free to omit the ABA from the
vetting process. Soundjudgment nevertheless suggests that the ABA's contribution
should not be dismissed lightly and that the administration wrongly suggests that
the ABA's participation clashes with some sort of sanctified process enshrined by
our Constitution.
While most thinkers decry the political nature of the confirmation battles, some
argue that political battles are a necessary and natural byproduct of the appointment
system the Constitution's Framers devised. Disagreement exists over whether the
Framers actually intended such a high degree of politicization,62 but most scholars
agree that the Constitution's Appointments Clause represents the judgment to
employ a power struggle - in the form of a separation of powers apparatus - for
appointing judicial officers in a manner that ensures balance, accountability, and
energetic evaluation of candidates.63
The Framers' debates reflect a struggle between those who feared executive
power, with its tendency toward monarchical abuse, and those who feared
than a "quest for truth"); Brannon P. Denning, Reforming the New Confirmation Process:
Replacing "Despise and Resent" with "Advice and Consent", 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 2-3
(2001) (suggesting that as we enter the 21 st Century, the "Confirmation Mess" has become
even messier in judicial as well as other appointed positions); Michael J. Gerhardt, Divided
Justice: A Commentary on the Nomination and Confirmation of Justice Thomas, 60 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 969, 975-76 (1992) (pointing to the debates over judicial nominees such as
Justice Brandeis, Justice Marshall, Judge Haynesworth and Judge Carswell; author says
presidents and senators have had "petty political concerns").
60 See, e.g., GERHARDT, supra note 32, at 230 (discussing the fallout from the ABA's
"divided vote on Robert Bork's qualifications as a Supreme Court nominee").
61 In fact, some Democratic senators suggested that political battles will worsen without
ABA early participation in the process.
62 See Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Taking Advice Seriously: An Immodest Proposal for
Reforming the Confirmation Process, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1577, 1581-82 (1992) (arguing that
although the Framers "undoubtedly intended the process of selection and confirmation by the
political branches as a check upon potential judicial tyrants, [they] almost certainly did not
intend the process to be as heavily politicized and partisan as it has become").
63 See, e.g., GERHARDT, supra note 32, at 28 (observing that "balance, accountability, and
energy" are apparent in the compromise embodied in the Appointments Clause).
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irresponsibility of the legislature." The Framers resolved the tension with a
compromise, seeking balance through the input of actors with varying inclinations,
strengths, and interests.65 As Hamilton explained, the division of power between
the president and the Senate provided "an excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism
in the [p]resident, and would tend greatly to prevent the appointment of unfit
characters [nominated as a result of] State prejudice, from family connection, from
personal attachment, or from a view of popularity.""6
The process established by the Framers is by definition sometimes rancorous.
After all, the Constitution suggests that the president "may have to pay a price if he
ignores the Senate's advice;" that is, the Senate may withhold its constitutional
power of consent over a given nominee.67 At least in Hamilton's estimation,
politics would play an important role in ensuring that the president and the Senate
experience political ramifications for abuse of their powers during the process.68
Some argue that cultural and technological changes have fueled politicization
of the appointments process, including a new combative Senate style that has
replaced "the clubby, 'go-along-get-along' atmosphere" that earlier prevailed.69
This lack of cooperation is exacerbated by the dominance of divided government
and the concomitant tendency to use confirmation hearings as a venue for power
struggles between political parties and for expression of strong sentiments about
controversial issues.7" To the extent that the ABA adds to the controversy, its
participation cannot be said to be contrary to the Framers' creation.
And the possibility exists that the ABA, although identified with certain policy
perspectives, may ultimately reduce furor in the process. From the time of the
Constitution's ratification, most presidents apparently navigated the appointments
process by pursuing an informal give and take with the Senate, even before formally
nominating candidates.7' Within the last 40 years, presidents found it expedient to
' See Eugene W. Hickok, Jr., Judicial Selection: The Political Roots of Advice and
Consent, in JUDICIAL SELECTION: MERIT, IDEOLOGY, AND POLITICS 3, 4 (Nat'l Legal Ctr. for
the Pub. Interest ed., 1990) (explaining battle lines for constitutional debates).
65 Id. (explaining that the compromise adopted would bring together the Executive's
strength of responsibility with the security the Senate could provide against inappropriate
nominations).
66 THE FEDERALIST, No. 76, at 483 (A. Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961).
67 GERHARDT, supra note 32, at 33.
68 Hamilton predicted that the "blame of a bad nomination would fall upon the President
singly and absolutely" and that the blame of rejecting a good nomination "would lie entirely
at the door of the Senate." THE FEDERALIST, No. 77, at 486 (A. Hamilton) (Benjamin
Fletcher Wright ed., 1961).
69 Denning, supra note 59, at 16.
70 Id. at 12-13.
"' See GERHARDT, supra note 32, at 32 (observing that "virtually every [P]resident has
understood that failure to consult" with Senators before nominating candidates "would likely
be costly to himself, his nominee, or both").
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consult with the ABA at an early juncture, a practice consistent with the presidential
approach of informally evaluating candidates' capabilities and preferences in light
of political practicalities. As an expert - albeit outside voice - the ABA is often
able to anticipate problems with potential nominations. Its input can assure that'
controversy is avoided and consensus is achieved, a state of affairs presumably part
of what the Bush Administration was concerned about "debasing."72
Moreover, to the extent that the president feels cramped or inhibited by ABA
prescreening, such a restriction is consistent with the separation of powers concern
animating the appointment structure. As Hamilton explained in response to critics
warning that some may use the confirmation power's leverage to influence the
president: "[i]f by influencing the President be meant restraining him, this is
precisely what must have been intended."73
2. Impartiality and Public Perception of Impartiality in the Courts
Particularly in a time of divided government - which has haunted us in the
recent past and may well continue for the foreseeable future74 - the work of a third
party (even a third party sometimes viewed as allied with one political party or
another) can help to avoid stalemates, disingenuous presidential assurances about
avoiding litmus tests and inquiries into nominees' ideology, and other possible
shams." Not only is this extra voice consistent with the Constitution's confirmation
structure, but it also reinforces public confidence in impartiality in our courts.
Balanced, unbiased justice more likely emerges through a checks and balances
process, with actors possessing competing perspectives. In such a system, the
public more readily believes that good things happen to people (such as receiving
a federal judicial nomination) because they have successfully navigated the scrutiny
of diverse - and sometimes hostile - actors, rather than simply because some
insider wired them for the job.
The ABA can contribute to impartiality and the appearance of impartiality in
a number of ways. First, as described above, the ABA can check favoritism, acting
72 Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, supra note 1 (quoting Senator Orrin Hatch).
3 THE FEDERALIST, No. 77, at 486 (A. Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961);
see also CARTER, supra note 59, at 32 (arguing that even for confirmation of cabinet officers
- who could be viewed as the president's 'own team' - the Founders understood that the
confirmation power was an important "check on the President's freedom to staff the
government and, hence, on his policies").
7' Denning, supra note 59, at 12 (reporting that in the last four decades, the White House
has been controlled by a different political party almost 70% of the time).
" Reynolds, supra note 62, at 1577-78 (describing "the minuet" between presidents and
Senate during periods of divided government as "an exercise in partisanship, politics, and
futility").
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as a thorn in the side of the executive, by "saying 'no' to the political muscleboys '76
and by "taking flak for the Senators."" Second, and perhaps even more
importantly, the ABA contributes to impartiality and public confidence in the
confirmation process by simply expressing a separate voice, with incentives
independent of those motivating the Executive and the Senate and with an informed
opinion on judicial qualification.
In the present era - where dominant legal thought no longer views law as a set
of neutral principles existing in a state of nature and awaiting discovery in the hands
of competent judges - the concept of impartiality is elusive and complex. While
some types of bias, such as personal and financial interest in an outcome, are
uniformly condemned as inimical to impartial justice, many gray areas remain.
Prevailing thought now allows judges many preconceptions and personal
perspectives, not as evidence of bias, but as simply part of an individual
decisionmaker's point of view. 8
Because true impartiality is now deemed illusory and perhaps not even
desirable,79 one can argue that the best-designed governmental system allows
diffused impartiality to emerge from the confluence of diverse perspectives and
opinions. Our nomination and confirmation process is surely such a system. That
being the case, the addition of another educated voice - the American Bar
Association - at an influential point in the process can only enhance the system.
According to this line of thinking (which is frequently offered to promote the
American jury system), any bias or preconception on the part of the American Bar
Association is not disqualifying, but acts instead to balance other biases or
preconceptions already present in the system. 0
76 ABRAHAM, supra note 18, at 38 (quoting a December 9, 1971, statement by a
representative of the ABA Committee, Robert L. Trescher, Esq.).
77 Id.
71 See Little, supra note 35, at 711-15 (reviewing grey areas of a judge's duty of
impartiality and surveying contemporary literature on impartiality); see also Laura E. Little,
Characterization and Legal Discourse, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 372,374-400 (1996) (discussing
how law and the legal process are creatures of multiple competing perspectives).
" See, e.g., In reJ.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d650, 651 (2d Cir. 1943) (asserting that "[i]f,
however, 'bias' and 'partiality' be defined to mean the total absence of preconceptions in the
mind of the judge, then no one has ever had a fair trial and no one ever will"); PATRICIA J.
WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 149-50 (1991) (exploring the benefits of
multiple perspectives and points ofview to broader understanding and bridging gaps between
members of society).
0 Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217,227 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (stating that
the "broad representative character of the jury should be maintained, partly as an assurance
of a diffused impartiality"); California v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 755 (1978) (noting the
"only practical way to achieve an overall impartiality is to encourage the representation of
a variety of such [diverse and overlapping] groups on the jury so that the respective biases
of their members, to the extent that they are antagonistic, will tend to cancel each other out");
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Given that the ABA Committee is not burdened with the same political baggage
as the president and Senate, and enjoys different skills and resources, its point of
view likely stands as a contrast and a complement to the official government agents.
This model of a process with diffuse interests competing to arrive at the best results
is reflected throughout the constitutional debates, in which delegates repeatedly
condemned partiality and favoritism in the appointment process."' For example,
James Madison argued against the Executive holding the appointment power alone,
reasoning that the Senate was "numerous eno[ugh] to be confided in." 2 Similarly,
Roger Sherman argued that, unlike the Executive, the Senate would bring to "their
deliberations a more diffuse knowledge of characters."83 Sherman added, "[i]t
would be less easy for candidates to intrigue with them.,"4 While the Framers may
not have considered whether a non-governmental entity like the ABA should assist
the president and the Senate, such assistance is certainly a logical and appropriate
complement of the Framers' design.
3. The Advantage of Consistency and Stability
The appointment system's integrity, as well as public esteem for its products,
are also enhanced by consistent and stable procedures, tested and followed across
significant periods of time. Although the ABA vetting process has evolved over the
last 40 years, that evolution has created a stable approach that can add consistency
Massachusetts v. Soares, 387 N.E.2d 499, 512 (1979) (noting importance of a representative
jury in case where peremptory challenges were exercised to exclude members of a particular
racial class); CHARLES W. JOINER, CIVILJUSTICEANDTHEJURY 26 (1962) (arguing that ajury
verdict is more impartial than a judicial verdict because group deliberation negates bias);
Phoebe A. Haddon, Rethinking the Jury, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 29, 65 (1994)
(reasoning that juries best resolve individual controversies because they consider competing
community perspectives and exchange diverse views); Richard Lepert, Why Do Juries Get
a Bum Rap? Reflections on the Work of Valerie Hans, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 453,461 (1998)
(expressing preference for jury decisions rather than judicial ones because jurors, deciding
as a group, cancel out each other's attitudes); Jeremy W. Barber, Note, The Jury is Still Out:
The Role of Jury Science in the Modern American Courtroom, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1225,
1228 (1994) (explaining historical rationale for jury trials assumes that an impartial jury is
constructed as a result of prosecutors and defense attorneys aggressively seeking partial
jurors who will balance each other out); Jim Goodwin, Note, Articulating the Inarticulable:
Relying on Nonverbal Behavioral Cues to Deception to Strike Jurors During Voire Dire, 38
ARiz. L. REV. 739, 742 (1996) (asserting that adversarial process induces prosecutors and
defense attorneys to select jurors that are favorably biased, under the assumption that the
biases will cancel each other out).
81 See infra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
82 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 120 (Max Farrand ed.,
1966).
83 2 THE RECORDS OF THEFEDERALCONVENTION OF 1787, at 43 (Max Farrand ed., 1966).
84 Id.
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to judicial evaluations even though the judicial selection process has historically
varied widely across administrations. In addition to standardizing qualification
guidelines and evaluation procedures themselves, ABA participation at a crucial
stage in nomination can bring greater credibility to the process and, thus, greater
respect for the appointees.
4. The Role of Lawyers in Society
As noted above, a significant aspect of the Bush Administration decision to
eliminate the ABA's prescreening function is the administration's implicit contempt
for the legal profession today.8" Suggested in the March 2001 letter, as well as in
statements of other ABA opponents, is the notion that - because the legal
profession has stooped so low as to use its flagship organization to endorse public
policy positions - lawyers no longer deserve a special voice in judges' selection.s6
Legal and academic literature currently maintains that the legal profession has lost
its claim to dignity and exclusivity because "lawyers have become less independent
and objective."87 Thus, the argument goes, the public no longer benefits from
preserving influential or special avenues for lawyers to express opinions.8
While perhaps appropriately sensitive to the divisive effect of ABA positions
on controversial subjects, this reasoning misconceives lawyers' role in society. The
consequence is to disqualify improperly the ABA from its valuable insights into
judicial selection and to damage the legal profession. The resulting lower prestige
for the legal profession may in turn hurt government and citizens themselves.
Gone is the unaccepting embrace of de Tocqueville's view of the legal
profession as a major source of social stability that keeps populist forces in check
and helps to weave liberal and democratic traditions throughout social strata.8 9
Indeed, the crisis in the legal profession and the decline in public esteem for lawyers
is well documented. Much concern exists that lawyers "have lost [their] moral
bearings." 9 The result, some maintain, is a "[l]oss of self restraint and dignity that
... has transformed all too many lawyers into the kind of hustlers that the bar once
strongly condemned."9
8 Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, supra note 1 (quoting Sen. Orrin Hatch).
86 Id.
87 Carl M. Selinger, The Public's Interest in Preserving the Dignity and Unity of the
Legal Profession, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 861, 870 (1997).
88 Id. at 863, 870.
89 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 123-27 (Richard D. Heffner ed.,
New Am. Library 1956) (1835) (arguing that American trust in lawyers "is the most powerful
existing security against excesses of democracy").
9 Amy E. Black & Stanley Rothman, Shall We Kill All the Lawyers First?: Insider and
Outsider Views of the Legal Profession, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 835, 858 (1998).
91 Id.
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But we might not be ready to give up on lawyers' special contributions to
judicial selection. We might not be ready to diminish them to the status of other
political interest groups with no expertise other than commitment to their members'
ideological beliefs. After all, lawyers still remain the group most familiar with
judicial processes. Moreover, commitment to social justice and reasoned
development of opinions on the issues most troubling society is entirely consistent
with the traditional model of lawyering, a model bemoaned as atrophied by those
tempted to oust lawyers from influential roles in society. In other words, the
paradigmatic lawyer-statesman is valued by society as an opinion leader.92 Mere
articulation of controversial opinions should not therefore automatically damn
lawyers to allegations of unprofessionalism.
Spiteful rejection of lawyers and their guidance can negatively affect the public.
For example, lawyers' loss of dignity can "undermine the public's respect for the
fairness of thejudicial process and eventually its willingness to accept the outcomes
of that process."93 Moreover, the quality of the legal profession may further erode,
reducing the law school applicantpool94 and discouraging individuals with excellent
skills and broad intellectual interests from entering the law and thereby protecting
the public from unchecked client self-interest.95
Minimizing lawyers' position in society likely triggers a similar downward
spiral of esteem within the legal profession itself. As explained by Talcott Parsons
and others, professional structures are best designed to subordinate the
professional's self-interested concerns to higher social values.96 Where the
92 MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: HOW THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL
PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY 102-08 (1994) (exhalting lawyerly
qualities such as sensitivity to issue, feel for common ground, understanding of future
possibilities, problem solving abilities, tolerance, and appreciation for the value of deliberate
(yet incremental) change); KRONMAN, supra note 50, at 14-15 (arguing that the model
lawyer-statesman should develop positions through her extraordinary deliberative powers that
guide other citizens in public and private life).
" Selinger, supra note 87, at 872 (quoting bar leader as saying that "when people lose
confidence in lawyers, they lose confidence in the rule of law" (citation omitted)).
"4 Deborah L. Rhode, The Professionalism Problem, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 283, 313
(1998) (commenting on connection between lawyer's sense of professional accomplishment
and their view of law as an honorable profession); Selinger, supra note 87, at 874 (reviewing
reasons why the loss of lawyers' dignity should matter to anyone other than lawyers).
" Selinger, supra note 87, at 874 (observing that lawyers can use shame to restrain clients
from engaging in questionable activities).
916 See, e.g., Talcott Parsons, The Professions and Social Structure, in ESSAYS IN
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 34,43-46 (rev. ed., 1964) (analyzing relationship among desire for
success with a given professional institutional structure, self-interest, and altruism); ROBERT
MERTON, SOME THOUGHTS ON THE PROFESSIONS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 11 (1960)
(explaining that professional organizations do not require members to "feel altruistic ... it
only requires them to act altruistically"), quoted in DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN,
LEGAL ETHICS 12 (3d ed. 2001).
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professional structure deteriorates, the argument goes, the professional's self-
interest starts to dominate. Maintaining dignity for lawyers heightens the
profession's incentive to self-police. Finally, any decrease in quality for the legal
profession resulting in the profession's lower esteem further affects potential
clients' willingness to rely on lawyers when it is in everyone's best interest that they
do so.97
5. Crisis in the ABA's Public Relations
The Bush decision to eliminate the ABA from its special vetting role is also, of
course, symptomatic of a public relations problem for the American Bar Association
itself. The precise source of animosity is complex. On one hand, the administration
points to ABA public positions on controversial issues as the cause of the ABA
ouster.9" Underlying this explicit explanation may be more specific complaints
about the ABA's votes in the Bork nomination and other ABA interactions with the
Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush Administrations. In addition, the animosity
may derive from more diffuse sources, such as concern with lawyers engaged in
power mongering and the generalized impression that lawyers create rules for the
primary purpose of benefitting only themselves, whether the rules concern
multidisciplinary practice, professional ethics, j udicial selection, or other matters.99
97 Selinger, supra note 87, at 877 (suggesting that lowering dignity of lawyers may
prompt individual clients to turn to those without legal expertise or to try "to muddle through
themselves," id. at 877-78).
98 Often highlighted is the ABA House of Delegates' decision to support reproductive
choice. See GERHARDT, supra note 32, at 230 (emphasizing ABA reproductive choice
decision as most damaging to public perception of ABA bias). For a list of other ABA
positions on issues considered controversial, see The Role of the American Bar Association
in the Judicial Selection Process, S. Hrg. 104-497, Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 88 (1996) (statement of Daniel E. Troy, Wiley, Rein and Fielding)
(listing house of delegates resolutions representing ABA "liberal positions").
99 See, e.g., Susan Bandes, Erie and the History of the One True Federalism, 110 YALE
L.J. 829, 838 (2001) (articulating the argument that the legal profession is "a powerful
special interest group that consistently sought to shape the law for the enhancement of its own
prestige and well-being, while wearing the mantle of detached concern for the rule of law and
the greater good") (reviewing EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE
CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2000)). This is not the first time that the ABA's suggestion
that it was speaking for the public is a veiled pursuit of narrow interests mongering. EDWARD
A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL
POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA
(2000) (discussing that within the context of diversity jurisdiction, ABA is described as
"[s]eriously misstating the law, ignoring evidence and arguments their adversaries presented,
and allying with clearly defined corporate interests" while at the same time insisting "that
they spoke for no client but the public").
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These generalized criticisms are well within the jurisdiction of the ABA, although
more appropriately reckoned with on a global level outside the specific context of
judicial selection. Nevertheless, the specific concerns flowing from partisanship
perceptions and public policy positions deserve close attention by those concerned
with the ABA's role in judicial selection.
a. Perceptions of Partisanship
The perception of ABA partisanship is difficult to cure because most ABA
decisions on judicial nominees are likely to displease one side of the political
spectrum or another. Indeed, Republicans have not always been the party that felt
undermined by ABA judicial ratings."0 Moreover, although beliefs in ABA
partisanship are deeply held, the allegations are sometimes hyperbolic'0 ' or
unsubstantiated.1
0 2
After the Bush Administration's March 2001 ouster of the ABA, the
organization used statistics to rebut the suggestion ofpartisanship. In particular, the
ABA trumpeted that, of the almost 2000 judicial candidates formally nominated by
the last nine administrations, the Committee found twenty-six nominees to be
unqualified, twenty-three of those individuals being nominees of Democratic
100 ABRAHAM, supra note 38, at 69-77 (discussing disgruntled reactions of Republicans
and Democrats to ABA actions); GOLDMAN, supra note 19, at 326 (describing ABA
positions on conservative judicial candidates, which angered "liberals"). Before the last
several decades, the ABA was generally associated with conservative positions. See
PURCELL, supra note 99 (arguing that ABA's actions in defending diversity jurisdiction
"showed the extent to which a partisan ideology controlled their thinking" as they sought to
protect conservative interests).
"0t One conservative critic, writing under the pseudonym "Publius," characterized the
ABA as espousing "leftist" positions. Publius, From Wall Street to Woodstock: The New
Politics of the American Bar Association in JUDICIAL SELECTION: MERIT, IDEOLOGY, AND
POLITICS 111, 117 (Nat'l Legal Ctr. for the Pub. Interest 1990) (criticizing ABA for
advancing an agenda "more commonly associated with the National Lawyers Guild, an
organization with identifiably radical origins").
'02 Judge Laurence Silberman argued, for example, that the ABA developed tensions with
the Reagan Administration because conservative judicial ideology is against the economic
self-interest of lawyers. Laurence H. Silberman, The American Bar Association andJudicial
Nominations, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1092, 1095 (1991) ("Because the fortunes of lawyers
as a class, and particularly litigating lawyers, tend to wax at a time of rising, not declining,
judicial power, it is not surprising that there were numerous conflicts between the ABA and
the Reagan DOJ."). That assertion does not ring true in principle and does not appear to have
born itself in practice, if one evaluates the decisions and other work product of Reagan-
selected judges. This is a reaction shared even by a strong critic of the ABA. See Publius,
supra note 101, at 117 ("[P]rofessional self-interest can only account for some of the policy
positions taken by the ABA in recent years .... ).
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presidents and three being nominees of Republicans.°a From this point, the ABA
pressed the inference that recent history does not support a Democratic bias.'°
But this statistic does not tell the whole story. Lacking, for example, are figures
on how many potential nominees the ABA tentatively rated as unqualified. For it
is this tentative rating, made before the candidate becomes a formal nominee, that
President Bush has eliminated from the process. The tentative rating is the one that
is so crucial to potential nominees' fates and that the ABA argues so persuasively
is key to the organization's ability to help make "the federal judiciary the envy of
the world."'0 5 In official literature, the ABA does not include figures on how many
potential candidates have been tentatively rated as unqualified, saying instead that
"no one knows" how many "potential candidates were never nominated because of
the Committee's evaluation" because "the information is never revealed by the
respective administration. ' °6
Statistics available from non-ABA sources are more ambiguous on the
partisanship issue. 7 A recent study of confirmed court of appeals judges found
that for the individuals of this group who possessed no priorjudicial experience, the
ABA granted a "well-qualified" rating to substantially more of President Clinton's
nominees than nominees of President George H. W. Bush.0 8 Specifically, the study
asserts that when the Bush and Clinton court of appeals nominees are viewed
together, "being nominated by Bill Clinton was a stronger positive variable than any
other credential or than all other credentials put together."'0 9 Statistics from other
sources could also arguably be read as suggesting a Democratic bias,"0 but might
' Statement by ABA President Martha Barnett in Response to White House Decision to
End ABA's Pre-Nomination Notification of Federal Judicial Candidates, at I (Mar. 22,
2001), available at http://abanet.org/media/statement2.html (last visited Sept 25, 2001).
"o Carter, supra note 40, at 18 ("Statistics overwhelmingly refute concerns that the ABA
committee favors Democrats over Republicans.").
'o5 Statement by ABA President Martha Barnett, supra note 103, at 2.
'o Frequently Asked Questions About the American Bar Association Standing Committee
on Federal Judiciary, at 2 (memorandum on file with the author and available from the
American Bar Association), available athttp://abanet.org/media/fedjudfaq.html (last visited
Sept. 25, 2001).
o7 For a rundown of ratings broken down by presidential administration, see GOLDMAN,
supra note 19, at 348-50; GROsSMAN, supra note 18, at 198.
"0 James Lindgren, Yes, the ABA Ratings on Judicial Nominees Are Biased, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 6, 2001, at A13. A longer version of this study will be published in the Journal of Law
and Politics and is available at http://www.law.nwu.edu/lindgren.
109 Id.
"' Stidham and Carp also point out that President Clinton seems to fair better on "well
qualified" ratings than the first term nominations of Carter, Reagan, and Bush, with 64
percent of Clinton's district court and 83 percent of Clinton's appellate court nominees
receiving this high ranking. CARP & STIDHAM, supra note 19, at 229. Carter apparently
follows Clinton as the president with the next highest percentage of exemplary ratings.
GERHARDT, supra note 32, at 120 (stating that Clinton is the only president to have a higher
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be more fairly interpreted as inconclusive on the partisanship issue, or as
representing a trivial difference between nominees by the two political parties."'
While the criticisms may not be balanced, one alleged practice from recent years
has contributed prominently to the partisanship perception. According to critics,
the ABA Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary improperly chose to cooperate
more with "liberal" groups, both in soliciting information about potential nominees
and in selecting with whom to share information."' The ABA has discontinued the
practice of furnishing lists ofprospective nominees to organizations, explaining that
"[i]n reexamining its operating procedures, the Standing Committee has concluded
that a practice of furnishing lists of prospective nominees to organized groups is
inconsistent with its concerns for confidentiality and obligations to the
President."' " The negative fallout from this type of partisanship allegation has
been exacerbated by criticism that the ABA is not an organization for all lawyers,
and that entire segments of the legal profession are insufficiently represented in
ABA membership and leadership."'
b. Public Position on Controversial Issues
As mentioned earlier, traditional models of lawyers in society value the
contributions of lawyers as opinion leaders.' Articulation of positions on difficult
social issues should not be branded as evidence of partiality that disqualifies
percentage of his nominees rated excellent or well qualified by the ABA than Carter); see
Fein, supra note 7, at Al 8 (observing that the ABA Committee gave Judge Richard Posner
a "lukewarm 'qualified' rating").
"' See CARP & STIDHAM, supra note 19, at 213 (opining that the "difference in quality
between Republican and Democratic appointees is trivial").
"2 See, e.g., The ABA Role in the Judicial Nomination Process: Hearing Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 36 (Senator Gordon J. Humphrey, reporting on
ABA arrangement with "liberal" groups to share information, influence "evaluation of
targeted candidates and in some instances derail nominations even before they could be
made"); Abraham, supra note 38, at 70 (stating that the lawsuit was filed by a conservation
organization, which alleged that the ABA Committee "relied primarily on liberal interest
groups to gather information about judicial candidates and actually released names of...
nominees to the ultra-liberal Alliance for Justice, a group organized especially to thwart
Reagan's promise to shift the direction of the courts").
113 Letter from Robert B. Fiske, Jr., Chair ofthe Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary,
to Douglas Johnson, National Right to Life Committee, Inc. (Dec. 2, 1985), reprinted in The
ABA Role in the Judicial Nomination Process: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 101st Cong. 324 (1989).
"14 See generally JOHiN C. SULLIVAN,... AND JUSTICE FOR ALL? 21-31 (1989) (criticizing
ABA for restrictive membership practices, biased control through canons of ethics, elite
control of rank-and-file lawyers, and double standards condemning ambulance chasing yet
encouraging corporation chasing).
". See supra notes 87-97 and accompanying text.
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lawyers or bar associations from participating in the government processes, such as
judicial selection. To so argue would unduly discourage lawyers from sharing with
other citizens the deliberative powers developed in legal training and the practice
of law. ' Taking stances on controversial issues and developing reasoned positions
based on formal legal concepts and competing moral principles is the essence of
good lawyering." 7
Yet thejudgment so valued in lawyers may also counsel against taking positions
in such a way and under such circumstances as to cause unnecessary furor and
acrimony. The positive contribution of communicating positions on controversial
social issues begins to wane if opinions are developed and communicated in a
dogmatic, insensitive or overaggressive way." 8  Moreover, a fine line exists
between lawyers as champions of social justice and lawyers stridently reinforcing
existing schisms in society and self-interestedly pursuing their own policy
perspectives. The backlash from ABA policy positions suggests that the ABA may
not always have navigated this line successfully.
Sometimes problems may have emerged simply as a result of timing. As
Professor Michael Gerhardt observed with regard to the ABA's reproductive choice
stance, the ABA's reputation for impartiality in the context of judicial selection
suffered because the ABA vote on the reproductive choice issue "coincided with the
increased intensity with which the Senate Judiciary Committee questioned judicial
nominees about their views on abortion rights," thus giving "the appearance that the
ABA was taking sides in a public debate."" 9
The ABA may have also unrealistically believed itself capable of developing
a unified position from a membership that is in fact pluralistic and divided.
Nonetheless - whether it be a fault of the ABA or an artifact of circumstances
116 See KRONMAN, supra note 48, at 14-15 (describing a lawyer-statesman model in which
society looks to lawyers to use deliberative powers so as to develop positions that guide other
citizens in public and private life). For a review of arguments concerning whether it is
inconsistent with the ABA's role to take positions on controversial issues, see, e.g., RHODE
& LUBAN, supra note 96, at 61-64 (reviewing arguments on both sides); Leslie M. Campbell,
Keeping Watch on the Waterfront: Social Responsibility in Legal and Library Professional
Organizations, 92 LAW LIBR. J. 263, 265 (2000) (summarizing arguments against ABA
taking positions on controversial social issues); David M. Leonard, Note, The American Bar
Association.' An Appearance ofPropriety, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 537, 563-64 (1993)
(arguing against taking positions on controversial issues).
"k' KRONMAN, supra note 48, at 14-16 (describing the model of the lawyer-statesman as
opinion leader).
118 Id. at 15 (describing the lawyer-statesman as possessing a stock of specialized legal
knowledge as well as practical wisdom, and the ability to be "more calm or cautious than
most people and better able to sympathize with a wide range of conflicting points of view").
119 GERHARDT, supra note 32, at 230. It was apparently in response to this situation that
the ABA Committee agreed formally not to take ideology into account in rating judicial
nominees. Id. (reporting on committee decision).
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beyond the organization's control - the ABA's position-taking has created an
unfortunate, broadly held conception of the organization as strident, imprudent, and
incapable of balanced deliberation. The ABA is advised to evaluate the toll
resulting from its policy positions and to inquire whether it can take positions on
divisive issues while continuing as an institution meriting respect from official
quarters and representing all lawyers, irrespective of ideological or political
preferences.
c. Subterfuge
Although harm from policy positions can come in the form of divisive relations
within and without the organization, an even more damaging consequence is the
perception that the ABA usesjudicial evaluations as subterfuge. Many believe that
the ABA imposes its policy predispositions on the federal judiciary under the guise
of rating judicial qualification. 20 Some have specifically accused the ABA of using
negative judicial characteristics such as lack of compassion or sensitivity as cover
for negative judgments about conservative political views or concepts of judicial
restraint.' The insinuation that the ABA suffers from lack of candor, abuse of
power, and deceptive techniques makes it even more important that the organization
and its Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary - seek out ways to improve
their reputations. 22 To this end, I sketch below preliminary suggestions for changes
in Standing Committee procedure.
III. ANTIDOTES TO PROBLEMS OF PARTIALITY AND PERCEPTION
12o GERHARDT, supra note 32, at 229-30 ("[The ABA] is best seen as a special conduit
through which potentially partisan considerations can be camouflaged as 'professional
qualifications' concerns, both by its members' actions in the federal appointments process
and by whichever senators find its formal recommendations useful.").
' See, e.g., The ABA Role in the Judicial Nomination Process: Hearing Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 36 (1989) (Senator Gordon J. Humphrey,
Member, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, claiming that while the ABA "purports to pass
solely on the professional qualifications ofnominees, there is strong evidence that the process
is tainted by ideological bias," as evidenced by the Bork nomination); id. at 201 (Paul D.
Kamenar, Executive Legal Director, Washington Legal Foundation, asserting that
temperament criteria is a way to "smuggle in Committee members' biases against certain
candidates"); Silberman, supra note 102, at 1095 (suggesting that the ABA used "the
codewords 'compassion' and 'sensitivity' and under "the banner of 'insensitivity"' rebuffed
"those nominees whose political views were identified with the conservative wing of the
Republican party or with notions of judicial restraint").
"2 For a summary of changes that the ABA can make as a broader organization to avoid
the damage resulting from taking positions on divisive issues, see Leonard, supra note 116,
at 559-63 (analyzing suggestions such as expanding ABA membership, holding referenda,
and limiting the ABA's agenda).
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A. Existing Protection
The ABA Standing Committee already has in place many protections against
abuse of power, subterfuge, and bias. Some are well lnown; some could be better
publicized. Perhaps the biggest restraint on the Standing Committee is its reactive
(rather than proactive) orientation. That is, the Committee does not actually
generate names of potential nominees, but "evaluates the qualifications of actual
and putative nominees" proposed by the president.'23 Although the ABA may have
originally wished that the Standing Committee take a more proactive role in
nominations,'24 the organization seems ultimately to have concluded that taking on
the reputation as "judge-maker" would diminish the prestige and effectiveness of
the Committee.'25
The other major category of protections in place are designed to separate the
functions of opinion leader and judicial evaluator within the ABA organization. 6
Steps already taken to reinforce the integrity of the Committee's work include
requirements that the Committee keep its work separate from the remainder of the
ABA organization and preventing the ABA's Board of Governors, House of
Delegates and Officers from becoming "involved in any way in the evaluations of
candidates."' 27 Governing Principles of the Committee provide that each member
must agree: (1) while on the Committee and for one year thereafter, not to seek or
accept a federal judgeship; and (2) while on the Committee "not to participate in or
contribute to any federal election campaign or engage in partisan political
activity."' 28 Governing principles also require each member to do her committee
work personally and independently.' 9
In service of its desire to maintain impartiality, the ABA has expressly
123 ABRAHAM, supra note 18, at 33 (describing ABA evaluative role); Little, supra note
35, at 737 (observing that the ABA's role is significant only for its negative effect, a nominee
being "likely to view a favorable ABA rating as one of many hurdles in the process, rather
than a benefit requiring repayment in some form").
124 GROSSMAN, supra note 18, at 77 (explaining that promoting the nomination ofpersons
that the Association deems best qualified was one of the major objectives of the ABA).
125 Id. at 100 (quoting ABA President as concluding that the label "judge-maker" would
cause the prestige and influence of the ABA to suffer).
'26 Ramo & Cooper, supra note 10, at 108 ("[T]here is truly a wall of separation between
the policies and the politics of the ABA and the workings of the Standing Committee.").
127 American Bar Association, supra note 12, at 2.
.28 Id. This prohibition means that a member may not host a fund raiser or endorse a
candidate for federal office. Id.
129 The Role of the American Bar Association in the Judicial Selection Process, S. Hrg.
104-497, Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Serial No. J- 104-82, 113 (May
21, 1996) (prepared statement of Roberta Cooper Ramo & N. Lee Cooper).
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disavowed evaluation of nominees' jurisprudential views. 3' Critics are quick to
point out, however, that this policy was a long time coming, developed only after
negative public relations and a series of modifications and negotiations. 3'
B. Possible Changes in Procedure
Changes in procedure are of course best designed by the individuals most
intimate with the organization of the ABA and its Standing Committee. A number
of areas nonetheless present themselves as candidates for innovation, most notably
changes in the composition of the Standing Committee, enforcement of Committee
rules, and amendment of the confidentiality requirements governing Committee
business. I analyze first the composition and enforcement issues, and then turn to
the more difficult question of confidentiality.
1. Size and Composition of the Committee
In 1996, a bipartisan group prepared a study released by the University of
Virginia's White Burkett Miller Center of Public Affairs. 32 Commenting on the
ABA Standing Committee, the Miller study ultimately concluded that although the
ABA Committee "has been criticized, alternatively by liberals and conservatives,
the committee is useful in evaluating the professional qualifications of judicial
130 Silberman, supra note 102, at 1098.
'"' Id. (characterizing the ABA's decision to eliminate ideology from its deliberations as
one made "grudgingly" after "negotiations" with the Department of Justice); see The Role
of the American BarAssociation in the Judicial Selection Process, S. Hrg. 104-497, Hearing
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Serial No. J-104-82, 8-9 (May 21, 1996)
(prepared statement of Dick Thomburgh), available at 1996 WL 276549 (F.D.C.H.), which
summarizes the following evolution of the ABA guidelines on the politics and ideology
question:
1977 and earlier: The Committee's evaluation is "limited to professional qualifications
- competence, integrity and judicial temperament";
1980: "The Committee's evaluation of prospective nominees to these courts is
directed primarily to professional qualifications[,] competence, integrity and judicial
temperament.... The Committee does not investigate the prospective nominee's political
or ideological philosophy except to the extent that extreme views on such matters might bear
on judicial temperament or integrity.";
1988: The Committee's evaluation criteria were modified, such that "[t]he word
'primarily' was deleted from the language quoted above, and the 'political and ideological'
language was broadened so as to read: Political or ideological philosophy are not considered,
except to the extent they may bear upon the other factors.";
1989: The Committee's evaluation is confined to "professional qualifications-
[ijntegrity, competence, and judicial temperament." The Standing Committee deleted
reference to consideration of "political or ideological philosophy."
132 The Miller Center of Public Affairs, supra note 10.
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nominees."' 33 The Miller Center report reported that, although some presidential
"administrations have found some of the committee's investigations duplicative and
too time consuming, there has been improvement...."' The Miller Center report
fashioned suggestions for reducing duplicative inquiries, but focused proposed
changes on entities other than the ABA.'35
The Miller Report did advocate, however, that the ABA expand the size of the
Standing Committee.'36 This suggestion is a sound response to complaints about
bias and lack of balanced representation in the Standing Committee. The ABA has
been dogged by complaints that its membership is narrow and unrepresentative of
the legal profession.'37 This criticism replicates itself within the context of the
Standing Committee, especially where it remains a small, clubby subset of the ABA
elite.
It is true that the ABA represents only a portion of the nation's lawyers, 38 and
its membership is also not precisely representative of the profession as a whole.'
This representation problem was exacerbated in the past by the tendency of the
Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary to be dominated by white men. 40
' Id. at 5.
134 Id.
13' To the extent that this concern is related to a need to expedite the evaluation process,
the ABA has recently turned its attention to the time it takes to complete its work. The ABA
has represented in recent correspondence with the White House that it is able and willing to
meet tight schedules in evaluating candidates. Letter from Martha W. Barnett, President of
the American Bar Association, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Apr. 23,
2001) (letter on file with author) (stating that, as matter of routine, the ABA can complete
an investigation in non-problem cases in 35 days from receipt of the Personal Data
Questionnaire, and that the ABA may be able to complete the investigation in less time in
special situations).
136 The Miller Center of Public Affairs, supra note 10, at 7 (recommending that the ABA
"expand the size of its Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary and have more than one
representative for each circuit"); accord Kamenar, supra note 50, at 93, 100 (suggesting that
the Committee increase its number of members, particularly in view of Committee members'
other professional obligations).
117 See infra notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
3' The ABA's own website reports that the ABA now represents approximately half of
all lawyers in the United States. American Bar Association, ABA History, at
http://www.abanet.org/media/overview/phistory.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2001). See also
ABRAHAM, supra note 18, at 33 (reporting that "ABA represents fewer than half of the
nation's lawyers"); GROSSMAN, supra note 18, at 81 (noting that although the ABA
represented fewer than half of the nation's lawyers in 1965, "the propriety of its assuming the
role of 'voice' of the American bar is much less questionable").
"' See, e.g., American Bar Association, Highlights from the 1999 Leadership Survey, at
http://www.abanet.org/solo/survey99.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2001) (reporting that solo
and small firm practitioners are underrepresented among leadership).
140 ABRAHAM, supra note 18, at 33 (observing that the Committee on the Judiciary once
bore the "tag 'establishmentarian"').
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Traditionally, the ABA Committee is said to have been composed of "largely...
older, well-to-do, Republican, business-oriented corporation attorneys."' 4
Consequently, suspicion arose that the Committee viewed "being wealthy and
conservative as positive traits and being liberal and outspoken as uncharacteristic
of 'a sound judicial temperament."" 42 Now that the ABA is associated with policy
positions deviating from conservative dogma, this perception may be changing.4
The ABA has taken significant strides in expanding representation in its general
membership and leadership,'" as well as in the composition of its Standing
Committee on Federal Judiciary.'4 Yet to avoid the claim that it has simply
replaced a conservative bias on the Standing Committee with a liberal one, the ABA
may find that expanding the size of the Committee to include a broader cross-
section of the organization would be an easily executed and well-received
innovation. Expanding the Committee's size would also respond to those critics
who argue that, because the Standing Committee is dominated by trial lawyers, the
Committee's recommendations too heavily emphasize trial experience as necessary
for judicial qualification.'46
A more complicated question is whether, in expanding the Committee, ABA
leadership should pursue an explicit policy of demographic and political diversity
'.. CARP & STIDHAM, supra note 19, at 227-28.
141 Id. at 228.
143 Id.
144 See, e.g., Saundra Toffy, In Speech, Dole Reignites Feud Over Bar Association,
WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 1996, at A10 (quoting ABA President as stating that 24% of ABA
members are women, a figure that roughly mirrors the percentage in the legal profession);
News Release, American Bar Association, ABA Diversity Commission Gives Association
Mixed Reviews in Evaluating Internal Diversity Successes (Feb. 17, 2001), available at
http://www.abanet.org/media/febO1/intemaldiversity.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2001)
(reporting that although statistics may not be accurate, they report a slightly higher minority
membership than the proportion of the legal profession that is racially or ethnically diverse);
News Release, American Bar Association, ABA Membership "Mirrors" Profession in Ethnic
Diversity, Commission Reports (Jan. 29, 1999), available at
http://www.abanet.org/media/jan99/g9min299.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2001) (reporting
that minority representation on the ABA mirrors that of the legal profession); American Bar
Association, A Snapshot of Women in the Law in Year 2000, available at
http://www.abanet.org/women/snapshots.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2001) (demonstrating
graphically that percentage of women ABA members is comparable to percentage of women
lawyers, although similar parity is not reflected in statistics for ABA leadership positions).
"'- ABRAHAM, supra note 18, at 33 (arguing that efforts to diversify membership on the
Committee on the Judiciary suggest that it no longer merits "the erstwhile factual tag
'establishmentarian.').
'" Silberman, supra note 102, at 1099 (asserting that "[b]ecause the Standing
Committee's membership is monopolized by trial lawyers, it is only human, if not admirable
for the 'brotherhood of the brief' to look askance at distinguished lawyers who are engaged
in anything other than the classic jury-trial practice").
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of its members. In defense of its efforts to ensure the Committee's impartiality,
ABA leadership has stated that an aspect of Committee members' backgrounds that
remains an unknown during the process of selecting members is political
affiliation. 47 One wonders whether, under a theory ofdiffuse impartiality, the ABA
leadership may better serve the country and better rebuff allegations of partisanship
and ideological subterfuge if it adopted a policy of selecting members for the
Standing Committee drawn from a balanced cross-section of political parties and/or
demographic groups.
2. Enforcement of Committee Policies
As noted above, the ABA has worked hard to implement many protections
designed to ensure that the Standing Committee's work is independent of the
ABA's policy-making efforts. The policies vest the ABA President with power to
sanction members who do not comply with these protections. Critics, however,
maintain that protective standards are not enforced.'48 Further efforts by the ABA
either to enhance its enforcement mechanisms, or at least to improve the public
perception that the mechanism works, would serve the Standing Committee's
credibility and esteem.'49
3. Confidentiality
The Miller Study's more problematic suggestion would require the Standing
Committee to provide the administration and the Senate Judiciary Committee with
'"" Ramo & Cooper, supra note 10, at 99 (asserting that the ABA never asks about
political affiliation and that members are "forced to leave their politics at the door").
14' John W. Kern III, Evaluating the Evaluators: The Standing Committee on Federal
Judiciary, in JUDICIAL SELECTION: MERIT, IDEOLOGY, AND POLITICS 85, 91 (Nat'l Legal Ctr.
for the Pub. Interest 1990) (asserting that ABA Committee's governing principles "would
appear to remedy the present deficiencies in the Standing Committee's processes-if only they
were to be properly enforced"); Charles E. Grassley, Reforming the Role of the ABA in
Judicial Selection: Triumph of Hope Over Experience?, in JUDICIAL SELECTION: MERIT,
IDEOLOGY, AND POLITICS 103, 108 (Nat'l Legal Ctr. for the Pub. Interest 1990) (advocating
the need for the ABA President to discipline Standing Committee members who breach the
Committee's confidentiality requirements).
49 Another criticism that may require only a quick fix is the concern that the Standing
Committee's scope of inquiry into potential nominees is too narrow. The ABA Role in the
Judicial Nomination Process: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st
Cong. 276 (1989) (Sen. Howard M. Metzenbaum, Member, Senate Judiciary Comm.,
suggesting that the ABA should "contact a wide range of groups before it rates a particular
nominee"). That concern, however, must be balanced against contrary concerns with
nominees' privacy as well as with the committee completing its work within a quick time
frame.
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a brief, but official, statement of reasons behind its judicial evaluations.'"
Although many have echoed this recommendation,"5 I complications arise because
of the Standing Committee's unqualified confidentiality policy.
The ABA maintains that it cannot render accurate evaluations without
confidentiality'52 - a position possessing both force and common sense. After all,
confidentiality not only loosens the tongues of informants, but saves embarrassment
of individuals found to lack the requisite qualifications before their names appear
in public sources.'53 Standard social science technique encourages confidentiality
as a handservant for accuracy.'54 Within the context of judicial selection, added
elements of power and intrigue make confidentiality an even more valuable tool for
ensuring that the forces of political favoritism do not motivate nominations. In fact,
the United States Supreme Court has even suggested that confidentiality of Justice
Department consultations with the ABA Committee may be constitutionally
mandated, as necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the president's Article II
power to nominate federal judges.'
ISO The Miller Center of Public Affairs, supra note 10, at 7 (explaining recommendation
of a "brief statement of the reasons" behind ABA rating).
151 Abraham, supra note 38, at 77 ("At a minimum all participants in the Judicial
Selection process - left and right, Democrat and Republican - would like to see the ABA
explain the reasons for its ratings."); Grassley, supra note 148, at 108 (advocating that the
ABA should explain ratings of "not qualified" on "objective grounds for that conclusion in
a written report to the Attorney General"); Kern, supra note 148, at 90 (observing that the
ABA Committee does not have to "explain in any way its vote" and that the "evaluation of
Judge Bork was contained in a report not even six pages in length"); Ross, supra note 33,
at 66 ("The reasons for maintaining confidentiality of sources and votes do not extend to the
sources of the information that furnished the basis for such votes.").
'52 American Bar Association, supra note 12, at 13 ([O]nly by assuring and maintaining
... confidentiality can sources be persuaded to provide full and candid information.");
Carter, supra note 40, at 18 (quoting ABA President Barnett as explaining that "'once a
nominee's name is out it might be hard to achieve the same level of candor' from local bar
members who are interviewed by the vetting committee').
1 See, e.g., Ross, supra note 33, at 66 (reasoning that because the "web of connections
between interviewees and a potential nominee" can be complex, "the potential for future
embarrassment or retribution" resulting from lack ofconfidentiality is "broad and intricate").
154 See, e.g., HERBERT F. WEISBERG ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO SURVEY RESEARCH
AND DATA ANALYSIS 91, 303-04 (2d ed. 1989) (noting the importance of confidentiality in
convincing individuals to participate in surveys); ELLEN J. WENTLAND & KENT W. SMITH,
SURVEY RESPONSES: AN EVALUATION OF THEIR VALIDITY 100 (1993) (designating
anonymity/confidentiality as a variable affecting motivation of individuals to respond
accurately to surveys); Martin Blumer, The Impact of Privacy Upon Social Research, in
CENSUSES, SURVEYS AND PRIVACY 3,4-5 (Martin Blumer ed. 1979) (stating that individuals
are less likely to withhold information when given adequate assurances about
confidentiality).
... Pub. Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440,466 (1989) (noting that
lower court made this constitutional holding and stating that requiring disclosure of Justice
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Intimately tied to confidentiality is timing. Once a potential candidate has been
nominated, the nominee takes on the power of a near-judge, with the potential to
affect the fortunes of those whose opinions are most often sought in the evaluation
process. Thus, lawyers who may practice in front of the judge are less likely to
share negative information, prudently aware that their statements may eventually
make their way to the judge's ears."3 6 Likewise, judges may be wary of disparaging
the character or legal abilities of a near colleague in whom the judge may rely for
a vote on an appellate panel, a workplace favor, or camaraderie in a sometimes very
isolated job. 57
Perhaps for these reasons, the early history of ABA participation in federal
judicial selection (195 8-1963) suggests that the Standing Committee's potence and
effectiveness in helping to sort through candidates and to identify subtle but
important differences among them is diminished considerably if the ABA is
relegated to a later point in the process.'58 ABA input before the name gets
submitted to the Senate is crucial, in large measure because of the possibility for
confidentiality at that stage. 59 The controversy surrounding the ABA prescreening
function actually demonstrates this point: the prescreening role must have
considerable influence, or those opposed to the ABA would not likely fight so hard
to eliminate it. 6
0
Confidentiality, however, does not mean that the ABA Standing Committee
should be absolved of all responsibility for explaining its actions. Moreover,
persuasive reasons weigh heavily against confidentiality. As Professor William
Ross argues, the ABA's judicial ratings would be far more useful to the Senate
Department consultations with the ABA Committee "would present formidable constitutional
difficulties").
156 Ross, supra note 33, at 66 (quoting a member of the Standing Committee as saying that
the Committee "'might as well quit"' if confidentiality is not maintained because "' [l]awyers
have to appear before judges"').
"5 Cf Silberman, supra note 102, at 1097 (expressing discomfort with the "Standing
Committee's practice of approaching federal judges in confidence and soliciting their
opinions on prospective nominees").
158 GROSSMAN, supra note 18, at 75-76 (reporting that where the ABA was consulted
around the same time a name was submitted to the Senate, the organization could not be "a
really effective advisor" because political commitments had already been made and the ABA
could not assist the attorney general in making delicate choices among candidates with
varying qualifications, all of whom were sponsored by prominent politicians).
... See, e.g., id. at 96 (ABA report sent after decision to submit name to the Senate "must
be made in the light of the inevitability of appointment"); American Bar Association, supra
note 12, at 13 (outlining importance of prenomination, confidential process).
160 Quintin Johnstone, Bar Associations: Policies and Performance, 15 YALE L. & POL'Y
REv. 193, 227-28 (1996) ("[The] controversy over ABA judicial recommendations is an
indication of the seriousness with which these recommendations are taken by political
decisionmakers.").
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Judiciary Committee - which enters the picture later in the time line - if detailed
reports, with explanations for the ratings, are provided.' 6' In addition, as the Miller
Study explains, the ABA Committee may avoid some charges of partisanship or
ideological motivation by providing reasons for its evaluation. The Standing
Committee's insistence on confidentiality has contributed to the negative
impression that it smugly believes itself above any obligation to explain its
decisions.'62 Third, the process of articulating reasons may assist committee
members in thoughtful consideration of the qualities that bear on quality judging.
An explanation requirement may even help committee members sort ideological or
partisan bias unwittingly coloring their evaluation. Finally, explaining its views to
the public reinforces the ABA's public service role of educating the public on law
and government.
One possible compromise between these competing concerns may come from
parsimoniously controlling what is disclosed. For example, the arguments outlined
above suggest that confidentiality is particularly important at the early stages of
investigation. With this in mind, the ABA may be able to accommodate, at least
partially, Senator Grassley' s suggestion that the Standing Committee should at least
provide a written report on "not qualified" ratings.'63 At the same time, this
suggestion implicates a new set of competing concerns of fairness to potential
nominees. As Professor William Ross points out, the ABA needs to be particularly
sensitive to claims of unfairness by persons who are not nominated because of a
negative rating. 64 Moreover, giving the candidate and executive branch the dignity
of explanations behind a negative rating may foster a more informed inquiry as to
the accuracy of the ABA's assessment. On the other hand, publication of reports
explaining unqualified ratings may embarrass persons under consideration and harm
161 Ross, supra note 33, at 66 (arguing for more explanations underlying ratings).
162 See, e.g., Kern, supra note 148, at 90 (observing that the ABA Committee does not
have to "explain in any way its vote" and that the "evaluation of Judge Bork was contained
in a report not even six pages in length").
163 Grassley, supra note 148, at 108 (advocating that the ABA should explain ratings of
"not qualified" on "objective grounds for that conclusion in a written report to the Attorney
General" and that the report should be submitted to the Senate Judiciary Committee if the
candidate is subsequently nominated).
" Ross, supra note 33, at 67 (observing that "an unfavorable rating may be more likely
to ruin a candidate's chances for nomination than to preclude confirmation if such a
candidate is nominated"). Another argument against breaching confidentiality is that the
ABA could become unnecessarily embroiled in controversies with interest groups claiming
entitlement to names and details. See THEABA ROLE INTHEJUDICIALNOMINATION PROCESS:
HEARING BEFORE THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 101st Cong. 323 (1989) (letter
from the ABA to Legislative Director ofNational Right to Life Committee, Douglas Johnson,
declining to heed requests that ABA provide the names of candidates given to it by the
Justice Department).
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their professional standing.'65 Moreover, disclosure may have a deleterious effect
on the accuracy of the information obtained because of the possibility that sources
could be identified even if not named in the report.
Although a close call, the arguments in favor of confidentiality are weightier
than those arguing against secrecy. I reach this decision by discounting some of the
fairness concerns weighing in favor of disclosing reasons for unfavorable ratings.
In this regard, I am persuaded by the observations of Professor Ross that ajudgeship
is not itself a "right" for all successful lawyers, and that those who have had their
hopes for a judgeship dashed are likely to continue with the level of professional
success that originally made them eligible for the judgeship.'66 I also note that
although making an exception to confidentiality may cause accuracy to suffer
considerably, the other side of the balance is not equally weighty: the quality of
judgeship candidates is unlikely to diminish if no exception to confidentiality is
made and the policy stays as is. In so reasoning, I assume that the pool of qualified
judicial candidates will continue to be larger than the amount of available positions.
Despite my conclusion that unqualified confidentiality should presently remain the
policy, I urge further thought on the issue, recognizing the possibility of a future
compromise that more adequately satisfies the competing concerns.
CONCLUSION
For topics of this kind, one is often tempted to point out that battle lines are
drawn not according to the merits of the procedures at issue, but according to who
is likely to win or lose under the alternatives under scrutiny; the argument here
being that Republicans attack ABA prescreening because they believe that the ABA
will be tough on their allies and the ABA advocates a prescreening role because it
wants to implement its own separate policy objectives and put "friends" on the
bench. This "whose ox is being gored" line of argument, however, is usually
unsatisfying and almost always unhelpful. In this world of competing perspectives,
we can do better at developing the most beneficial system for exercising power in
government.
It behooves us to continue to consider innovations, given that the issue is not
resolved and is likely to reemerge.'67 At present, I ultimately settle on a continued,
165 Ross argues that this concern could be addressed by encouraging a practice whereby
the ABA prepares only an abbreviated report, "available for inspection and publication only
at the behest of the candidate." Ross, supra note 33, at 68.
"6 Id. (arguing that "[n]o one has a right to become a judge" and that "a candidate's
failure to obtain a judgeship is unlikely to create any stigma that seriously affects the
candidate's professional standing").
167 Now enjoying control over the Senate after the spring 2001 party change by Sen.
Jeffords, Democratic members of the Senate have expressed a desire to restore the ABA to
its prescreening role. See Alissa J. Rubin, Democrats'Big Edge on Senate Panels; Politics:
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prominent role for the ABA in prescreening judicial candidates with a concomitant
change in ABA orientation and attitude. This orientation and attitude change
should include frank discussion of past problems and a willingness to consider and
to implement further procedural changes, including searching for ways to explain
ratings, increasing the size and representation on the Standing Committee,
reinforcing the wall of separation between the Committee and the ABA policy-
making branches, and taking other actions to facilitate good relations with the
public and to eliminate the perception of inappropriate bias and partisanship.
With Leadership Posts, Party to Hold Sway Over Bush's Agenda, L.A. TIMES, May 26, 2001,
at Al ("Leading Democrats want to restore the ABA's role because they say it provides a
rounded look at candidates' professional records."). In the meantime, the ABA has continued
to, evaluate candidates after the administration has announced their names. See Amy
Goldstein, ABA Weighs in on President's Court Nominees, WASH. POST, June 27, 2001, at
A23 (reporting that the ABA gave positive ratings to Bush's seven federal appeals court
nominees).
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APPENDIX 1168
March 22, 2001
Dear Ms. Barnett:
Thank you for taking the time to meet with Attorney General Ashcroft and me
on March 19. We very much appreciated the opportunity to visit with you and
benefited from your perspective on the judicial selection process. In addition to
hearing from you, we have carefully studied and considered the history and practice
of American Bar Association involvement in judicial selection. Although the
President welcomes the ABA's suggestions concerning judicial nominees, the
Administration will not notify the ABA of the identity of a nominee before the
nomination is submitted to the Senate and announced to the public.
There is a long tradition by which Members of Congress, interest groups, and
individual citizens provide suggestions to the President about potential judges. We
will continue to welcome such suggestions from all sources, including the ABA.
The issue at hand, however, is quite different: whether the ABA alone -- out of the
literally dozens of groups and many individuals who have a strong interest in the
composition of the federal courts - should receive advance notice of the identities
ofpotential nominees in order to render pre-nomination opinions on their fitness for
judicial service. In our view, granting any single group such a preferential, quasi-
official role in the nomination process would be unfair to the other groups that also
have strong interests in judicial selection. As Senator Biden asked in 1994, "Why
the ABA and not the National Bar Association?" The same question could be asked
with respect to numerous other groups.
The question, in sum, is not whether the ABA's voice should be heard in the
judicial selection process. Rather, the question is whether the ABA should play a
unique, quasi-official role and thereby have its voice heard before and above all
others. We do not think that kind of preferential arrangement is either appropriate
or fair.
It would be particularly inappropriate, in our view, to grant a preferential, quasi-
official role to a group, such as the ABA, that takes public positions on divisive
political, legal, and social issues that come before the courts. This is not to suggest
that the ABA should not adopt policy positions or express its views. But
considerations of sound constitutional government suggest that the President not
grant a preferential, quasi-official role in the judicial selection process to a
politically active group.
Our decision to treat the ABA in the same manner as all other interested parties
168 A copy of this letter is available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2001/03/20010322-5.html.
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mirrors the approach taken in recent decades by Presidents of both parties with
respect to Supreme Court nominees, as well as the approach taken by the Senate
Judiciary Committee in 1997 when it ended the ABA's quasi-official role in the
Senate confirmation process. As Chairman Hatch explained at that time,
"[p]ermitting a political interest group to be elevated to an officially sanctioned role
in the confirmation process not only debases that process, but, in my view,
ultimately detracts from the moral authority of the courts themselves."
Finally, let me reiterate that the Administration fully welcomes the ABA, like
other interested parties, to provide suggestions regarding potential judges.
Similarly, once the President submits a nomination to the Senate, the ABA like
every other interested party is free to evaluate and express its views concerning the
President's nominee.
Thank you again for your time and your views, as well as for your service to the
ABA and the profession. The Administration looks forward to working with you
in the months ahead on issues of concern to the legal profession.
Sincerely yours,
Alberto R. Gonzales
Counsel to the President
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